ABSTRACT Recently, several privacy-preserving auction schemes are proposed for protecting the bid privacy and securing the auction. In this paper, a sealed-bid auction scheme focusing on multi-attribute is presented. And it mainly concentrates on the security issues of multi-qualitative-attribute auction and utilizes the Pedersen commitment scheme to bind the bid information into commitment for strong bid privacy. In order to accomplish the public verifiable correctness, the buyers and sellers construct the zero-knowledge signatures of knowledge and publish them to the bulletin board. In accordance with the security analysis, major properties, strong bid privacy and public verifiability, are provided under the semi-honest model. According to a comparison of computation, the proposal's computation cost is reasonable.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet and information technology completely changed the way that people solve the traditional problems [1] - [17] . While, it also brings a variety of security and privacy issues [18] - [23] . A security protocol can ensure the security of the applications by using the cryptographic methods and it can perform a security-related function. In order to solve these practical security problems, many cryptographic protocols including real authentication [24] , [25] , keyword search in encrypted cloud [26] - [28] ,verifiable data auditing in Cloud [29] are proposed. These approaches have played a very important role in security protocol design.
With the rapid development of the Internet and the fast economic growth, E-commerce plays an important role in facilitating economic activity and service level. Especially, e-auction has played a very important role in e-commerce times and it has been applied to various fields with assorted environments. Multi-attribute e-auction, which is a primary mechanism, can automate negotiations in electronic commerce and it supports auto-negotiation multiple attributes in the transaction.
Secure multi-party computation, which creates methods for parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while revealing nothing but the result of the function, is an important subfield of modern cryptography. E-auction is just one application of many examples in the secure multi-party computation.
Follow the development of the market demands, people have more requirements and are no longer satisfied with the price as the only critical measurement to determine who is the winner of an auction. The concept of 'Configurable offer' is proposed by Bichler and Kalagnanam. It not only characterizes the possible configurations of a configurable offer as a set of quantitative and qualitative attributes but also defines the constraints on the association of attribute values and discounts, markups according to some combination of attribute values [30] . Engel and Wellman propose a multi-attribute auction which accommodates Generalized Additive Independent(GAI) preferences and maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes and provides an open competition among suppliers over a multidimensional domain [31] . Singh and Benyoucef propose a novel fuzzy winner determinate method TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) defining many kinds of utility functions and calculating the ratio of deviation from the positive ideal offer with the deviation from the negative ideal offer [32] . A multi-attribute bid structure is proposed by Ray et al. [33] . Price and non-price attributes are included in their multi-attribute bid. While the bid structure of Ray et al. just describes the dependent relationship between price attribute and corresponding non-price quantity attribute and independent relationship among non-price qualitative attributes. However, [30] and [31] define the dependence of qualitative attributes and the logical constraints of qualitative attributes are not pressed by those bid structures, which have a influence on the quantitative attributes. Some researchers believe that the interdependent relation among attributes may be used for evaluating a solution [34] , [35] . To overcome this issue about dependence, they utilize ANP(Analytic Network Process)in place of AHP(Analytic Hierarchy Process) to enhance the ability of processing the interdependent relations among attributes. Moreover, they make full use of the TOPSIS for more evaluation to avoid rank reversal phenomenon and so on [34] .
A secure multi-attribute protocol requiring online Trusted Third Party (TTP) is proposed by Srinath et al. [36] . In [36] , the bid privacy is weak because of the computation of score function. Furthermore, public verifiability can not be provided in [36] . Srinath et al.'s second protocol utilizes homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptosystem for achieving bid privacy and public verifiability [37] , [38] . However, because a bid needs to be revealed to auctioneer during the auction, so the bid privacy is still weak [38] .
A scoring function is described as: [36] and [38] . Where, S denotes the total score of the bid evaluation, K denotes the number of non-price attributes, x r denotes the value of the r th attribute organized by the seller, w r denotes the weight associated with the attribute, f r (·) denotes the valuation function corresponding to the attribute, and P denotes the bid price [36] . It indicates that f r (·) only evaluate independent attribute instead of interdependent attribute relation. So the winner determination model of [36] and [38] is based on the assumption that a multiattribute bid can be evaluated to value through linear scoring function S. Finally, Homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptosystem is adopted for number comparison under encryption in Srinath et al.' scheme.
Multi-attribute e-auction is still facing many security issues. Security problems should receive more attention and concern. Security requirements, such as anonymity, traceability, unforgeability, are defined by the researchers who focus on the security issues in e-auction [39] - [42] . Even though researchers have already solved some security problems of multi-attribute e-auction which are mentioned above, multi-qualitative-attribute e-auction mechanism introduces several new security issues, such as multi-attribute privacy-preserving winner determination. Based on Shi's scheme [43] , a verifiable sealed-bid multi-qualitativeattribute based e-auction protocol is proposed. It adopts the Mayer and Wetzel's scheme and mainly focuses on strong bid privacy and public verifiable correctness under semi-honest model [44] . It utilizes the Pedersen commitment scheme to bind the bid information into commitment for the strong bid privacy. In order to accomplish the public verifiable correctness, the buyers and sellers construct the Zero-knowledge signatures of knowledge and publish them to the bulletin board.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. SEMI-HONEST MODEL
Following their prescribed actions in the protocol, all parties are supposed to perform computations and message exchanges under the semi-honest model. They may possibly record whatever they perform and try their best to guess as much information as they can during the protocol. Every party could launch arbitrary polynomialtime calculations deviating from the prescribe protocol actions. A standard definition form Goldreich is adopted [45] , [46] . 
In such a case, it expressed as X c ≡ Y . Definition 2: protocol π securely computes deterministic functionality f with static semi-honest adversaries if there are probabilistic polynomial-time simulators S 1 and S 2 such that
where |x| = |y|. 
B. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SIGNATURES OF KNOWLEDGE
Let p, q be large primes such that q|p − 1. let Z * q be the cyclic subgroup of Z * p of order q with independently chosen, random generators g, h. The public parameters are g, h, p, q.
1) SIGNATURE OF KNOWLEDGE OF DISCRETE LOGARITHM
The prover chooses a random t ∈ r Z * q and computes c = H (y, g, g t ) and r = t − c · e. The verifier can check whether c = H (y, g, g r g c ) given c and r. It is denoted by ZKDL(e|y = g e ) [47] .
2) SIGNATURE OF KNOWLEDGE OF EQUALITY OF TWO DISCRETE LOGARITHMS
The prover chooses a random t ∈ r Z * q and computes c = H (y 1 , y 2 , g, h, g t , h t ) and r = t −c·e. The verifier can check whether c = H (y 1 , y 2 , g, h, g r y c
1 , h r y c 2 ), given c and r. It is denoted by ZKEDL(e|y 1 = g e ∧ y 2 = h e ) [48] .
3) SIGNATURE OF KNOWLEDGE OF REPRESENTATION
The prover chooses a random t i ∈ r Z * q for i=1,2 and com-
, given c and r 1 ,r 2 . It is denoted by ZKREP((e 1 , e 2 )|y 1 = g e 1 ∧ y 2 = g e 2 · h e 1 ) [49] .
C. PEDERSEN COMMITMENT SCHEME
An information-theoretically hiding commitment scheme by Pedersen is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption [50] . To commit a x ∈ Z * q , the sender generates r ← r Z q and compute
To open a commitment, the sender reveal x and r, the receiver verifies whether C x = g x · h r .
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
As shown in Figure 1 and 2, the proposed scheme is composed of the planning phase,the bidding phase and the winner determination and verification phase. Assume that there exist M buyers and n sellers in the auction scheme. A bulletin board is established for publishing auction information. A Certification Authority (CA) is adopted in key pre-distribution process. For digital signature, public/private key pairs are arranged in the buyer and seller groups. A buyer B i can sign message x as Sign B i (x), where
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The buyer group publishes the attribute sets A = {a 1 , . . . , a i , . . . , a m }, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, m denotes the cardinality of A. There is a corresponding attribute-value set a i = (a i 1 , . . . , a i j , . . . , a i k ) for each element in A, a i j denotes a bit string of length l, j denotes whether a attribute-value 
(3) If B verifies the proof π 2,S i,j , π 3,S i,j , then computes seller S i , where O S i,j = O B i,j , the seller who possesses the j will be the winner. The winner determination process can be checked and verified by other sellers in the same way. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
. First, it can easily be seen that an honest prover will always succeed in constructing a valid proof since
Second, assume that a cheating prover who does not know S i can be proved by the same way. 
, 
After B i verifies the proof π 2,S i,j , π 3,S i,j and checks whether the bid equals O S i,j .
Theorem 3: In the winner determination phase, if
Proof: By theorem 4.2-4.5, it shows a bid does not have to be opened for achieving winner determination and public verifiability in the proposed scheme, so the strong bid privacy is provided during an auction.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND EXPERIMENTS
At first, a comparison among related protocols is summarized in Table 1 . Because of complicated relation among attributes, the bid expression is important to winner determination process. In [36] and [38] , a linear utility function is introduced for multi-attribute bid evaluation. It is assumed that every attribute is independent in each multi-attribute bid using linear utility function. The bid structure of the proposed scheme and Shi's scheme are flexible to support independent, dependent and interdependent attribute relation [43] . Accordingly, [36] , [38] only support quantitative attribute winner determination, the proposed scheme and Shi's scheme can support both quantitative and qualitative attribute winner determination. It is assumed that all parties launch computations and message exchange according to protocol specifications in these schemes. However, during or after protocol execution, any party might try his/her best to infer as much additional information as possible. In addition, a TTP support is needed in [43] .
Furthermore, a comparison of the computation operations in related protocols is shown in Table 2 . Assume that the length of the prime number p is 512, 1024, 1536 bits in modular exponentiation, public key encryption, certification and signature (for RSA), hash function digest is 512 bits (for SHA-1). Because computation operation of RSA can be summarized as a modular exponentiation operation, and the computation operation of a modular exponentiation is about O(|L|) times that of a modular multiplication, where |L| denotes the bit length of L. So compared with a modular multiplication computation in Z * n , the computation time consumed by hashing operations and random generation can be neglected [52] . At last, a performance simulation is provided. Reference [36] , [38] , and [43] and proposal are implemented in C using MIRACL library and server configuration: Microsoft Windows XP Professional 2002 Service Pack 3, Intel(R) Core(TM), CPU 2.53 GHz, 1.98 GB of RAM [53] . The average time for computing a single modular exponentiation is 1.2ms for 512-bit,7ms for 1024-bit,and 30ms for 1536-bit. t, T , n denotes the number of bid, attribute and seller separately. For a small-scale system design, assume that n > T ≈ t. Several experiments have been done and three typical experiments are shown in Figure 3 , 4, 5. The comparisons of computation time of the related protocols are shown in Figure 3 , 4, 5. Because strong privacy and public verifiability can not be provided in [36] , the computation time of [36] is much less than [38] . Due to [43] takes hash function instead of public key system, the computation time of [43] is much less than [38] in the opening and winner determination phase. According to Figure 3 , 4, 5, it shows that the computation cost of the proposed scheme is reasonable and less than [38] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
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